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The forest of Basel III has too many trees  
Karel Lannoo 
10 February 2011 
he new Basel III Accord confirms the radical shift in bank capital requirements. The focus is on 
more and better quality capital, primarily for the large banks. Now, the larger and the more 
‘universal’ a bank is, the more capital it will need, which is the opposite of what had been the 
case before the crisis. But the new framework is becoming very complex, and policy-makers had 
better cut some of the dead wood out of the earlier versions of the Basel accords for the sake of clarity. 
The multitude of required ratios and divergent implementation deadlines will not ease the task of 
assessing a bank’s soundness. When will a bank effectively be Basel III-compliant? 
The new Basel framework, published on 15 December 2010, is an important building block in the new 
post-crisis regulatory paradigm. It maintains the current risk-weighted capital ratios framework (tier 1 
and 2), and adds, on top of a stricter definition of capital: 1) a minimum ratio of common equity, 2) a 
capital buffer and 3) a countercyclical provision. It complements these risk-weighted ratios with 4) a 
simple leverage ratio, and two minimum liquidity requirements: 5) a liquidity coverage ratio and 6) 
the net stable funding ratio. These new rules will be introduced from 2013 onwards over an extended 
transition period, and will all be fully applicable from 2019 onwards. Two important elements still 
need to be filled in: the re-calibration of the risk-weight of assets and a surcharge for large, 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).  
The new framework is considerably more complicated than that of the current Basel II, which required 
banks to hold a minimum of 8% of regulatory capital based on risk-weighted assets. Basel II (2005) 
had amplified the possibilities to calculate the soundness of the asset base of the bank, and added 
Pillar 2 (supervisory review) and Pillar 3 (market discipline) without changing the minimum capital 
ratio or definition of capital set out in the original 1989 Basel Accord. Basel III narrows the definition 
of capital and adds other ratios. But it retains the base for calculating the risk weightings of assets, i.e. 
on the basis of the ratings assigned by credit rating agencies (ERBA) or by internal risk models 
(IRBA). 
The new framework is composed of several building blocks, each of them with different 
implementation deadlines (see the table below). The upgraded 8% minimum Tier 1 + Tier 2 is 
applicable from 2013, but the restricted definition of capital will be phased in gradually and will only 
fully apply from 2018 onwards. The table below sums up the different ratios, the minimum levels and 
their implementation deadlines. 
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Basel III ratios and deadlines 
Ratios  Basel II  Basel III Deadline 
Minimum Tier 1 leverage  n.a. 3% 2018 
Risk-weighted ratios:   
1. Minimum Common Equity Capital  n.a. 4.5% 2015 
2. Capital Conservation Buffer   n.a. 2.5% 2019 
1+2=  n.a. 7% 2019 
3. Minimum Tier 1  4% 6% 2015 
4. Minimum Tier 1+2  8% 8% 2013 
Countercyclical capital buffer  n.a. 0 - 2.5% 2019 
Liquidity coverage   n.a. 2015 
Net stable funding ratio   n.a. 2018 
Deductions from common equity  n.a. 2018 
 
The new Accord discusses at length the definition of capital, which raises the question why it never 
managed to harmonise this in the first place. Common equity, consisting of equity capital and retained 
earnings, must be at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at all times, effective from 2015 onwards. The 
inclusion of minority interests in equity capital is restricted to the elements that fully meet the criteria 
of equity capital. Other elements will be phased out over a 5-year period. Based on an analysis of the 
large banks, the IMF has estimated that between 20 and 30% will have to be deducted from the current 
Tier 1 ratio to arrive at the new common equity capital ratio, with Europe being on the higher end. The 
proposed deductions would lower these banks current Tier 1 capital ratio from 8.6% to 6.7%, or to 
5.8% including the market risk provisions.
1 Banks should accumulate retained earnings in response, 
and thus pay less to shareholders in dividends or employees in bonuses. 
In addition to the new core capital ratio, except during periods of stress, banks should hold buffers of 
capital above this regulatory minimum of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. Banks not meeting the capital 
buffers will be subject to capital distribution constraints. The capital conservation buffer will be 
phased in from 2016 onwards, and be fully effective from 2019. 
The creation of a countercyclical capital buffer will be decided by national jurisdictions, under Basel 
Guidelines, when excess aggregate credit growth is judged to be associated with a build-up of system-
wide risk. It will vary between zero and 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. The charge can be applied 
regionally or on a national basis for internationally active banks. The timing is the same as for the 
capital buffer.  
Two other ratios set minimum prudential standards for liquidity risk management. The liquidity 
coverage ratio requires banks to hold a minimum of high-quality liquid assets to meet its liquidity 
needs for 30 days in a stress situation, designed not only to deal with a bank run, but also with stresses 
in wholesale markets. The net stable funding ratio focuses upon guaranteeing stable sources of funding 
on the liabilities side. Under normal circumstances, if a minimum capital standard is well regulated, 
there would be no need for liquidity regulation.  However, in times of stress, debt markets can become 
illiquid, drastically reducing the substitutability of debt for in cash, as was also clear during the 
sovereign crisis in some euro countries. 
Compared with Basel II, the update substantially extends the requirements and introduces significant 
changes for banks, supervisors, investors and users. Rather than using only one ratio, for example, 
banks will now be assessed on the basis of up to seven different ratios! The crisis had clearly 
demonstrated that the old Basel II Tier 1 (and 2) ratio had become of limited relevance. Its definition 
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of capital was too broad, and not sufficiently harmonized. It was biased towards, e.g. sovereigns and 
real estate exposures, and incomplete with regard to exposures to off-balance sheet instruments or 
trading positions. As a result, markets started to increasingly use the leverage ratio, a very crude, but 
probably the most transparent measure.  
The combined effect of a minimum leverage ratio, a risk-weighted minimum common equity ratio and 
capital buffer, and minimum liquidity requirements should result in a better capitalised and thus more 
resilient banking system. But important deficiencies of Basel II remain to be addressed, or have been 
kept in place. For example, the risk-weightings have not been reviewed nor has the use of external 
credit rating agents been critically examined in the ratings-based approach to determine the risk 
weights. The criteria for ratings have been strengthened, and rating agents are requested to comply 
with the IOSCO Code of Conduct. Also the use of the internal ratings is maintained, although forms of 
self-regulation have been widely discarded as a result of the crisis. 
The big question that emerges from this complex structure is how does one determine when a bank is 
effectively Basel III-compliant, as some will soon start to claim. Is it when it meets all ratios at the 
same time? Or will it be when it complies with the leverage ratio and the minimum levels of common 
equity and capital buffer? Will banks then also refer to their ratios under all different elements, as they 
have done with Tier 1 and Tier 2 of Basel II so far? This becomes very confusing for investors and 
depositors alike. Moreover, outsiders will only be able to personally check one of the ratios, the 
leverage ratio, as s/he will not have access to information on the subdivision of assets according to risk 
weightings. Market discipline thus remains a weak part of the Accord. 
These questions should be taken into account as the EU embarks on the transposition of Basel III into 
legislation. The EU could strive to improve the accessibility of Basel III by introducing some limited 
simplification of its provisions, for example by abolishing the old Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital ratios. It 
could indicate what the benchmark ratio will be. It could also synchronise and shorten the 
implementation deadlines, although it could be expected that the EU banking industry will rapidly 
complain about competitive distortions. However, the EU has already acted unilaterally, with the 2009 
and 2010 amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), which imposed higher charges 
for the trading book re-securitisation and new rules on bonus payments. Rating agents are now 
licensed and separately supervised in the EU, subject to strict governance and conduct of business 
criteria.  
But the most sensitive issue in the EU implementation will be the risk-weighting of sovereigns, which 
are 0%, irrespective of the rating. Under Basel II, they are 0% until AA-, 20% until A- and 50% from 
BBB+, the level at which Greek debt is now rated. Another hot issue is the weighting of real estate, 
where Basel II applied a 35% risk weighting for residential property and 50% for commercial real 
estate. The latter is one of the many instances of national discretion or implementation options, which 
currently total some 141 in the CRD (see the website of the European Banking Authority 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/). With the increased use of regulations in financial services and the 
objective to arrive at a single rulebook for the new supervisory authorities, a huge task lies ahead for 
the EU to come forward with a streamlined Basel III and to withstand pressures for national discretion. 
 